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Abstract
We want to take a diﬀerential game approach with price dynamics
to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal merger
of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into con-
sideration the open-loop equilibrium. We show that in relation to the
fact that the demand is nonlinear and prices follow some stickiness an
incentive for small merger exists, while it does not appear under the
standard approach using a linear demand function.
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1 Introduction
The existing literature on the profitability of horizontal mergers within the
static Cournot framework demonstrates that a merger will be profitable to
the merging firms provided that either the number of merging firms is large
enough (typically, too large to be realistic) or the merger creates a strong syn-
ergy (typically, a reduction in the average costs bringing about the well known
eﬃciency defense). Convincing illustrations of these claims can be found in
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990), re-
spectively. The subsequent contributions have enriched the discussion along
much the same lines. Levin (1990) and Cheung (1992), using diﬀerent se-
tups, demonstrate that at least 50% of the market should merge to provide
a profitable merger. Gaudet and Salant (1991, 1992) show that if a subset of
firms were to produce below their Cournot equilibrium quantity, their profits
would fall if the subset of firms is not large enough. the eﬃciency argu-
ment is first advocated by Perry and Porter (1985), showing that if firms can
benefit from some economies of scale the merger will become profitable, and
then extensively discussed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), who find that a
horizontal merger that does not generate synergies raises the price and this
price increase can make the merger profitable only when the market share of
merging firm is large enough.
All of the above is based upon a static approach. There are also stud-
ies addressing the profitability of mergers using dynamic models. Dockner
and Gaunersdorfer (2001), through a numerical analysis, and Benchekroun
(2003), analytically, revisit the diﬀerential game introduced by Fershtman
and Kamien (1987) to assess horizontal mergers among firms that compete
in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with price adjustments. They consider feed-
back and open-loop equilibria where the demand function is linear. Cellini
and Lambertini (2007) model the optimal capacity and output decisions of
oligopolistic firms in a dynamic game with capital accumulation a´ la Ram-
sey. Borrowing the non-lnear demand structure from Anderson and Engers
(1992, 1994), they allow for non-linear market demand functions. They use
this setup to investigate the role of horizontal mergers in driving the economy
towards the Ramsey modified golden rule.
Here, we take an alternative route to the analysis of the incentive to carry
out small mergers table when the pre-merging degree of concentration is high
but any cost saving through the merger is ruled out by assumption. To do
this, we take a diﬀerential game approach with sticky price dynamics a` la
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Simaan and Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987), combined
with a non-linear demand structure a` la Anderson and Engers (1992, 1994).
Given the shape of the resulting maximization problem, we take into consid-
eration the open-loop equilibrium only, focussing on the interplay between
price stickiness and the curvature of demand. The main point we make in
this paper boils down to the following: as the market shrinks because de-
mand becomes convex, firms bear increasing profit losses, and this creates
an incentive for small mergers that would not appear under the standard ap-
proach with a linear demand function. Additionally, our analyis also singles
out the existence of a parameter region where the merger between two firms
out of three is always profitable, for any degree of price stickiness as well as
for some degree of concavity of the demand function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
the layout of the model. Sections 3 illustrate the pre-merger open-loop equi-
librium. The assessment of profit incentives towards small mergers is carried
out section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The setup
Consider a dynamic oligopoly where n symmetric firms produce the same
homogeneous good over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) , all of them with the
same constant average and marginal cost c = 0. The notional market demand
function is defined as follows:
Q(t) = A− (pˆ(t))α , α > 0.
The above function is always downward sloping, and can be either convex
(0 < α < 1) or concave (α > 1). If α = 1, it is linear. In each period, the
market price pˆ(t) is determined by the following inverse demand function:
pˆ(t) = (A−Q (t))
1
α . (1)
where Q (t) =
nP
i=1
qi(t) is the industry output and qi(t) ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
is the individual output of firm i at time t.
However, since price is sticky, the actual market price does not adjust
instantaneously to the notional price level (1). That is, pˆ(t) will diﬀer from
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the current price level p(t) at any time except that in steady state, with the
price moving according to the following equation:
dp(t)
dt
≡ p˙(t) = s {pˆ(t)− p(t)} , (2)
where s (0 < s <∞) is a constant parameter that determines the speed of
adjustment. The lower is s, the higher is the degree of price stickiness.
The instantaneous profit function of firm i is
πi(t) = p(t)qi(t).
Therefore, the objective of firm i is
max
qi(t)
Ji =
∞Z
0
e−ρtp(t)qi(t)dt, (3)
subject to (2) and to the initial condition p(0) = p0 and the non-negativity
condition p(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞). The factor e−ρt discounts future gains,
and the discount rate ρ is assumed to be constant and equal across firms.
The elasticity of demand function (1) w.r.t. price, εQ,P , can be written
as follows:
|εQ,P | = − ∂Q (α)∂p (Q (α)) .
p (Q (α))
Q (α)
=
αpα
A− pα .
In view of the fact that the problem at hand is not defined in a linear-
quadratic form, we solve the diﬀerential game using the open-loop informa-
tion structure.
3 The pre-merger Cournot equilibrium
We consider the sum of the consumer surplus and the individual profits of
the present firms as the appropriate measure of the social welfare level. Since
the marginal cost is zero, the social welfare is the full integral of the curve
up to the otimal level of output, Q∗:
SW =
Z Q∗
0
(A− z)
1
α dz =
α
1 + α
∙
A
α+1
α − (A−Q∗)
α+1
α
¸
(4)
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Here, since there is no fixed cost, the merger cannot be carried out and
justified on the basis of an eﬃciency argument, and we are not going to dwell
upon whether any merger might be socially acceptable. Accordingly, we will
focus solely on the firms’ incentives.
In solving the quantity-setting game between profit-seeking agents, we
shall focus upon a single representative firm, whose Hamiltonian function is:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
½
qi(t)p(t) + λ(t)s
∙
(A− qi(t)−Q−i (t))
1
α − p(t)
¸¾
, (5)
where λ(t) = µ (t) eρt, µ (t) being the co-state variable associated to p(t).
As a first step, we can prove the following:
Proposition 1 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of
the price and the output of firm i are
q∗ =
αA (ρ+ s)
s+ αn (ρ+ s)
,
p∗ = (A− nq∗)
1
α .
Proof. Taking the first-order condition (FOC) on (5) w.r.t. qi(t), we obtain
p (t)− 1
α
sλ(t) (A− qi(t)−Q−i (t))
1
α−1 = 0. (6)
which seems to be unsolvable because of the exponent
1
α
− 1. In general,
what is done is to take the FOC, solve it w.r.t. the control variable and then
diﬀerentiate w.r.t. time. What we actually want is not the explicit solution
of (6) w.r.t. qi(t), but rather a control equation describing the evolution of
the individual output over time. Hence, we can diﬀerentiate the FOC (6)
w.r.t. time in the first place and then, by introducing a symmetry condition
qi(t) = qj(t) = q(t) for all i, j on outputs, we get the control equation as
follows:
dq (t)
dt
= q˙ (t) =
(A− nq (t))1−
1
α
∙
αsλ˙(t) (A− nq (t))
1
α − α2 (A− nq (t)) p˙ (t)
¸
ns (1− α)λ(t) .
(7)
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Then, we can solve the FOC (6) to obtain optimal value of shadow price at
any instant t:
λ(t) =
αp (t) (A− nq (t))1−
1
α
s
. (8)
Now, we diﬀerentiate the Hamiltonian w.r.t. the state variable to build up
the co-state equation:
−∂Hi(t)
∂p(t)
= −q(t) + λ(t)s = ∂µ(t)
∂t
=⇒ λ˙(t) = ∂λ(t)
∂t
= λ(t)(s+ ρ)− q(t), (9)
and finally we have to account for the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µ(t).p (t) = 0.
Now observe that (2) and (8) together with the (9) can be plugged into (7)
to rewrite the control equation explicitly. The stationarity condition at the
steady state equilibrium requires (i) q˙ (t) to be equal to zero, and (ii) p (t)
to be equal to pˆ, so that the resulting coordinates of the unique open-loop
equilibrium point are:
q∗ =
αA (ρ+ s)
s+ αn (ρ+ s)
,
p∗ = (A− nq∗)
1
α .
This concludes the proof.
The resulting per-firm profit in steady state is
π∗ (n) =
α (ρ+ s)
s
µ
sA
s+ αn (ρ+ s)
¶α+1
α
which is a function of the vertical intercept of demand, time discounting, the
number of firms, the degree of price stickiness and the curvature of demand.
We are now ready to assess the profitability of a small horizontal merger.
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4 The incentive to merge
The puzzle of bilateral mergers in a Cournot tripoly is a recurrent theme in
the debate on mergers, as observation suggests that indeed this is precisely
the type of merger one happens to observe in reality. For example, this has
been the case with the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas that
has turned the world industry for large civil air transport into a duopoly,
the other competitor being Airbus. To tackle this issue, we set n = 3 and
focus on the profitability of a merger involving two firms out of three. In a
triopoly, two firms will find it profitable to merge horizontally if and only if
the following condition is satisfied:
π∗ (n = 2)
2
− π∗ (n = 3) > 0
or, equivalently,
1
2
µ
sA
s+ α2 (ρ+ s)
¶α+1
α
−
µ
sA
s+ α3 (ρ+ s)
¶α+1
α
> 0.
That is, the fifty percent of the individual duopoly profits once the merger
has taken place must be higher than the individual profits before the merger.
Since the level of the reservation price A is irrelevant, the above condition is
indeed equivalent to the following:
1
2
µ
2ρ+
µ
2 +
1
α
¶
s
¶−α+1α
−
µ
3ρ+
µ
3 +
1
α
¶
s
¶−α+1α
> 0 (10)
The above condition can be studied in the space (α, s/ρ) . This is done in
Figure 1, where the region in which inequality (10) holds, or in other words
the merger of two out of three firms is profitable, is represented by the area
below the curve.
This figure shows that if the market is suﬃciently small (for all α < 0.42,
which is the asymptotic value attained if s/ρ becomes infinitely high), then
the incentive for a horizontal merger involving two firms out of three always
exists irrespective of speed of adjustment. The essential reason is that when
demand becomes convex, the market shrinks and this clearly hinders firms’
profitability, a fact which creates an incentive to merge. Interestingly, this
result extends to the static game for the same reason. If the prices adjusts
instantaneously, then the limit of the open-loop setup is the static model (the
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same happens if ρ tends to zero). This can be verified simply by taking the
static model and compare it with the limit case where the ratio s/ρ tends to
infinity (see Cellini and Lambertini, 2004). Figure 1 clearly shows that, in the
static game where s/ρ shoots up to infinity, the merger is indeed profitable
for all α ∈ (0, 0.42).
Figure 1 : Merger profitability in the space (α, s/ρ)
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As the market becomes larger (i.e., α increases), the incentive to merge is
determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level. In fact, it
turns out that the profitability of the merger is driven by a sort of tradeoﬀ be-
tween the curvature of demand and the speed of price adjustment (weighted
for the discount rate): as the market enlarges, the price has to become stick-
ier in order for forms to be willing to merge. Put it diﬀerently, for compara-
tively higher values of α one would be tempted to exclude investigating the
merger incentive because operating in a larger market increases the stand-
alone profitability and this points in the direction of making bilateral mergers
unprofitable, all else equal. This is not the case if the increase in α goes along
with a decrease in s/ρ. The intuition behind this mechanism can be spelled
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out as follows. When price adjusts very slowly, this involves making large
systematic mistakes in setting the output levels. Firms would like to play the
correct Cournot equilibrium with a large market but they cannot because s is
very small and there they have an incentive to decrease the number of firms
to recover what they are losing. This creates a region where α > 1 and s/ρ
is suﬃciently small to yield convenient bilateral mergers, as Figure 1 indeed
illustrates.
The problem can also be approached from another angle, namely, by
fixing s/ρ and then evaluating the profitability of a merger involving m firms
out of n. In such a case, the profit incentive exists iﬀ:
π∗ (n−m+ 1)
m
− π∗ (n) > 0
or, equivalently,
1
m
µ
1
s+ α (n−m+ 1) (ρ+ s)
¶α+1
α
−
µ
1
s+ αn (ρ+ s)
¶α+1
α
> 0 (11)
Condition (11) is assessed in Figure 2, where it yields a parametric family
of curves, between the two curves depicted here, with the characteristic that
the region where the merger is profitable, which is bellow the curves, enlarges
if stickiness and discounting become higher which make sense according to
the aforementioned reasons.
This figure says that if α is sharply below 1, a small merger is indeed
privately convenient. This makes sense because market size shrinks as α
decreases. Now, if the market becomes smaller, because the demand from
linear becomes convex, it becomes less profitable. Consequently, it is easier
to find conditions whereby a small merger works. Therefore, for a given
initial population of firms, say 10, if they are squeezed inside a very small
market, then some of them find it profitable to merge because their profits are
squeezed by the decrease in α, while they would not if the market were larger.
In the linear case when α is equal to 1 (along the flat line drawn in Figure 2),
we know from Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) that a profitable merger
must involve about 80% of the oligopolist, which is dramatically close to a
merger to monopoly.
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Figure 2 : Merger profitability in the space (m,α)
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the consequences of horizontal mergers
taking a diﬀerential game approach with sticky prices where the demand
function is nonlinear. Given the shape of the problem at hand, we have
analyzed the open-loop solution only.
Eﬃciency implications being ruled out by assumption, in our model it
is clear that any decrease in the number of firms brings about a decrease
in social welfare via a decrease in consumer surplus. Given the fact that, in
principle, when there is no saving on the overall industry costs, any horizontal
merger is socially harmful, then the regulator must look out for mergers
driven by the pressure generated by market size on firms, when the demand
is non-linear. This has some interesting implications on the empirical side,
as estimating market demand functions may indeed yield clearcut hints as
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to whether the market under consideration is likely to generate incentives
towards horizontal mergers.
11
References
1. Anderson S.P. and Engers M. (1992), Stackelberg vs Cournot oligopoly
equilibrium, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, 127-
35.
2. Anderson S.P. and Engers M. (1994), Strategic investment and timing of
entry, International Economic Review, 35, 833-53.
3. Benchekroun, H. (2003), The closed-loop eﬀect and the profitability of
horizontal mergers, Canadian Journal of Economics, 36, 546-65.
4. Cellini, R. and Lambertini, L. (2004), Dynamic oligopoly with sticky
prices: Closed-loop, feedback and open-loop solutions, Journal of Dy-
namical and Control Systems, 10, 303-14.
5. Cellini, R.,Lambertini,L. (2007), Capital accumulation, mergers, and the
Ramsey golden rule, in Quincampoix, M., Vincent, T., Jørgensen, S.
(Eds.), Advances in Dynamic Game Theory and Applications, Annals of
the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol. 8. Birkhauser, Boston,
487-505.
6. Cheung, F.K. (1992), Two remarks on the equilibrium analaysis of hori-
zontal mergers, Economics Letters, 40, 119-23.
7. Deneckere, R. and Davidson, C. (1985), Incentives to form coalitions
with Bertrand competition, RAND Journal of Economics, 16, 473-86.
8. Dockner, E.J. and Gaunersdorfer, A. (2001), On the profitability of hor-
izontal mergers in industries with dynamic competition, Japan and the
World Economy, 13, 195-216.
9. Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1990), Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium
analysis, American Economic Review, 80, 107-26.
10. Fershtman, C. and Kamien, M.I. (1987), Dynamic duopolistic competi-
tion with sticky prices, Econometrica, 55, 1151-64.
11. Gaudet, G. and Salant, S.W. (1991), Increasing the profits of a subset of
firms in oligopoly models with strategic substitutes, American Economic
Review, 81, 658-65.
12
12. Levin, D. (1990), Horizontal mergers: The 50-percent benchmark, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 80, 1238-45
13. Mehlmann, A. (1988), Applied Diﬀerential Games, Plenum Press, New
York.
14. Perry, M.K. and Porter, R.H. (1985), Oligopoly and the incentive for
horizontal merger, American Economic Review, 75, 219-27.
15. Reinganum, J. (1982), A class of diﬀerential games for which the closed
loop and open loop Nash equilibria coincide, Journal of Optimization
Theory and Applications, 36, 253-62.
16. Salant, S.W., Switzer, S. and Reynolds, R.J. (1983), Losses from hori-
zontal merger: The eﬀects of an exogenous change in industry structure
on Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 185-
213.
17. Simaan, M. and Takayama, T. (1978), Game theory applied to dynamic
duopoly problems with production constraints, Automatica, 14, 161-66.
13
 
